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THE SUICIDE DEFENSE IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ARTHUR LARSON*
S uicide may be made the basis of a defense against a workmen's
compensation claim in several ways. The most direct is reliance
on the specific defense, present in 43 state statutes' and in the Long-
shoremen's2 and United States Employee's Compensation Acts, 3 of
suicide or intentional self-injury. It may also be argued that suicide does
not arise out of the employment, since the source of harm is per-
sonal. It can be said that suicide is not accidental, but rather inten-
tional. It could even be argued that suicide is a departure-indeed
the most irrevocable and final of all possible departures-from the
course of employment. Discussion of the suicide defense is simplified,
however, by the fact that, whatever the approach taken, the ultimate
rule of law appears to be the same. The issue boils down to one of
proximate cause versus independent intervening cause.
Most cases in this field present the same pattern of facts: a se-
vere, or extremely painful, or hopelessly incurable injury, followed by
a deranged mental state ranging from depression to violent lunacy,
followed in turn by suicide. The basic legal question seems to be
agreed upon by almost all authorities: It is whether the act of suicide
was an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation between
the initial injury and the death. The only controversy involves the
kind or degree of mental disorder which will lead a court to say that
the self-destruction was not an independent intervening cause.
Since the law on this issue has undergone a substantial change
in recent years, and is still changing, a quick summary of the broad
outlines of the story may be helpful before a detailed analysis is
undertaken.
At one time the field was dominated by the "voluntary willful
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. A.B., Augustana College, 1931;
B.A., 1935; M.A., 1938; D.C.L., Oxford University, 1957.
1. The state statutes which make no specific reference to suicide or intentional
self-injury are those of Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, and Wyoming.
2. Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(b)
(1970).
3. Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (a) (2) (1967).
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choice" test, sometimes called the rule in Sponatski's Case,'t under
which compensation in suicide cases was not payable unless "there
followed as the direct result of a physical injury an insanity of such
violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an un-
controllable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy without conscious
volition to produce death." This doctrine was gradually displaced
as majority rule by the "chain-of-causation" test, which found com-
pensability if the injury caused the deranged mental condition which
in turn caused the suicide.
Under the chain-of-causation test there remains, however, some
room for uncertainty on precisely how deranged the decedent's mind
must have been. New York has repeatedly emphasized the necessity
for some brain derangement as distinguished from severe melancholy.,
Other chain-of-causation jurisdictions have employed varying terms
to describe the requisite mental condition, sometimes similar to those
used by New York, sometimes not as exacting. Moreover, even in
states that might nominally still appear to adhere to the Sponatshi
rule, the application of the rule in practice may produce results diffi-
cult to distinguish from those in chain-of-causation jurisdictions.
I. THE VOLUNTARY WILLFUL CHOICE TEST
Most of the American jurisdictions that were first to deal with
the suicide defense began by taking over bodily the rules of tort law
on this subject. Sponatski's Case, whose formula is that most often
found repeated in these cases, 7 said:
This decision rests upon the rule established in Daniels v. New
4. In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915).
5. Id. at 530, 108 N.E. at 468.
6. See notes 39, 47-49 infra & accompanying text.
7. Jurisdictions which currently appear to recognize the Sponatski rule-to the
extent that there have appeared no subsequent cases broadening, ignoring, abandoning
or producing results inconsistent with it-including the following:
Iowa: Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 95 N.W.2d 40 (1959). An employee suf-
fered severe injuries as the result of an on-the-job fall. One week later the worker took
his own life. There was expert testimony that the antecedent accident caused mental
derangement which was the proximate cause of the suicide. An award was resisted on
the ground that the injury was caused by the employee's willful intent to injure himself.
The court held the death compensable, stating that the widow had satisfactorily proved
that her husband "was motivated by an uncontrollable impulse" or was "in a delirium
of frenzy, without conscious volition to produce death." Id. at 581, 95 N.W.2d at 45.
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York N.H. & H.R. Co.8 [a tort case] .... That rule applies to cases
arising under the workmen's compensation act. It is that, where there
follows as the direct result of a physical injury an insanity of such vio-
lence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncon-
trollable impulse or in a delirium of frency "without conscious voli-
tion to produce death, having a knowledge of the physical conse-
quences of the act," then there is a direct and unbroken causal con-
nection between the physical injury and the death. But where the re-
sulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary willful
choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which
knows the purpose and the physical effect of the suicidal act, even
though choice is dominated and ruled by a disordered mind, then
there is a new and independent agency which breaks the chain of
causation arising from the injury.9
Armed with this formula, courts have plunged into the murky
depths of every conceivable kind of broken and anguished mind, and
have tried to classify the cases as compensable or not, according to
whether the employee killed himself through a voluntary (though
insane) choice or through a delirious impulse. The compensable cases
are frequently marked by some violent or eccentric method of self-
destruction, while the noncompensable cases usually present a story
of quiet but ultimately unbearable agony leading to a solitary and
undramatic suicide. For example, compensation claims were success-
ful in the case of a worker who, maddened with pain as a result of
getting hot lead in his eye, jumped from a hospital window; 10 in a
similar case of a worker who, during acute melancholia attending
his hospitalization for physical injuries, leaped from a window;" in
the case of a man who, driven to distraction by the pain of phlebitis,
became violent in his home, struck his step-daughter, and then rushed
Missouri: Mershon v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Corp., 359 Mo. 257, 221 S.W.2d 165
(1949).
New Jersey: Konazewska v. Erie R.R., 132 N.J.L. 424, 41 A.2d 130 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 133 N.J.L. 557, 45 A.2d 315 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945). The employee committed
suicide following a period of manic-depressive psychosis caused by a work-connected
injury. Causal relation between the injury and the derangement, and between the
derangement and the suicide, was established by expert testimony. But compensation
was denied because of the presence of the element of conscious volition.
Texas: Jones v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 599, 169 S.W.2d 160 (1943).
Vermont: McKane v. Capital Hill Quarry, 100 Vt. 45, 134 A. 640 (1926)
(dictum).
8. 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903); see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 455 (1965) (largely reproduces formula).
9. 220 Mass. at 530, 108 N.E. at 467.
10. In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915).
11. Gasperin v. Consolidated Coal Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 A. 187 (1928).
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out and hanged himself;12 in the case of a worker who, morbidly de-
pressed after a spinal injury, succeeded in starving himself to death; 13
in the case of an employee who, in the course of a drinking episode
to kill the severe pain of his aggravated osteo-arthritis, locked himself
in the cellar and stabbed himself in the neck with a knife;'1 and in
the case of a decedent who, after severe depression and confinement
in a mental hospital following a hand injury, thrust his head against
a running power saw.' 5 But denials were issued when the employee's
suicide, though motivated by unbearable pain, took the form of
walking into a cornfield, after talking sensibly to neighbors, and shoot-
ing himself;16 of traveling to Canada and committing suicide in a
lonely hotel room; 17 and of waiting until the family had gone to Sun-
day school before committing the act.'8
Much of the evolution of the law on the suicide defense has been
described and measured in the form of appraisals of the extent to
which the Sponatski doctrine has been modified or abandoned. Un-
fortunately for the cause of clarity, however, the Sponatski doctrine
is not a unitary concept, but contains two components. As a result,
when it is announced that a jurisdiction has accepted or rejected or
narrowed the Sponatski rule, the statement is apt to be confusing un-
less the announcement also specifies that it is referring to one or the
other or both of the components-and almost no opinion on record
has been this specific.
The two components may be labeled, for brevity, the "uncontrol-
lable-impulse" factor and the "knowledge-of-physical-consequences"
factor.
A moment's reflection will confirm that these two elements deal
with somewhat different mental or emotional conditions. Uncon-
trollable impulse has to do with the will; knowledge of consequences
has to do with the understanding.
It is abundantly evident that the second element is traceable to
12. McFarland v. Department of Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d 714
(1936).
13. Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N.E. 330 (1924).
14. Kelly v. Sugarman, 5 App. Div. 2d 1023, 173 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1958).
15. Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P.2d 364
(1952).
16. Kasman v. iHiman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d 762
(1942).
17. Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942).
18. Industrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
the criminal law test of insanity in M'Naghten's Case.19 But there is a
decisive difference between the role of "insanity" in criminal law
murder cases and in workmen's compensation suicide cases. 20 It can
well be argued in a criminal case that the accused's understanding is a
crucial element, since it is necessary to the establishment of criminal
intent. But in the suicide defense in workmen's compensation cases, the
only legal issue is causation, and this in turn depends on the will, not
on the understanding. If the injury so acts upon the will that it is not
operating independently at the time of the suicide, then the chain of
causation is clear, since there is no independent intervening cause.
Whether the decedent knew the physical consequences of his act is
utterly irrelevant to this question of causation. Using Sponatski's own
words, if the injury produced a literally uncontrollable impulse to
suicide, how can causation theory demand more? Postulate that the
decedent as a result of his injury was driven by an uncontrollable
impulse to produce what he understood perfectly well was his own
physical death. To say that such an act was causally independent of
the injury is to defy the plain meaning of words.
It is significant that, either tacitly or expressly, almost all courts
in modem time have recognized the illogic of grafting the knowledge-
of-physical-consequences component onto the causation rules gov-
erning the suicide defense. Indeed, there appears to have been only
one case reported in the last quarter-century in which the knowl-
edge-of-consequences component of Sponatski figured in a denial of
compensation, and that was a four-to-three Pennsylvania intermediate
court decision, with a vigorous dissent attacking the importation of
the M'Naghten criminal law standard into compensation law.2 ' The
Sponatski case itself was reversed legislatively, and in Wisconsin a
similar rule was reversed judicially.22 One has the distinct impression
19. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
20. See, e.g., Zimmiski v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 200 Pa. Super. 524, 530, 189
A.2d 897, 900 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
21. 200 Pa. Super. 524, 189 A.2d 897 (1963) (suicide following silicotic disa-
bility held not compensable).
22. Massachusetts amended its statute to provide for compensation when "due to
the injury, the employee was of such unsoundness of mind as to make him irresponsible
for his act of suicide," MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 26 (1937).
In Wisconsin, this result was achieved judicially in Brenne v. Department of Labor,
Indus. & Human Relations, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 156 N.W.2d 497 (1968). The decedent, a
lineman, received a severe electrical shock in the course of his employment, and sus-
tained multiple burns to various parts of his body. He later committed suicide. The
Wisconsin Act allows recovery only "when the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted."
47
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that the old knowledge-of-consequences ingredient survives in a
jurisdiction like New Jersey23 pending only a suitable opportunity for
reversal to bring the rule in line not only with the modern view in
other states but also with the spirit of the state's own interpretation
of its compensation law in many other areas.
Even with the knowledge-of-consequences component of Spo-
natski largely written off, there remains to be considered the uncon-
trollable-impulse component. In some jurisdictions, it will be found
that courts still cite the Sponatski rule as their take-off point, and then
go on to apply that rule as if the only component were the uncon-
trollable-impulse requirement. Such jurisdictions, whether they real-
ize it or not, have cut out of Sponatski the feature that is at once the
most distinctive and the most indefensible. If they then go on to give
a rather flexible meaning to uncontrollable impulse, as many of
them do, the net effect is that they have joined the company of those
states which have expressly renounced Sponatski and put in its place
the straight chain-of-causation test.
The State of Washington provides an interesting example of
how Sponatski can be "modified" almost out of existence without quite
being disavowed. For many years, 24 and as recently as 1968,25 Washing-
ton was considered to be in the Sponatski column. Then, in 1969, came
the Schwab case.26 It had been before the Supreme Court three years
Relying on Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942), note
17 supra & accompanying text, and on the statute, the hearing examiner denied com-
pensation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration and
further hearing, declaring:
The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish by substantial evi-
dence that the "chain-of-causation" exists. The claimant does this by showing
that the industrial injury caused the suicide....
[T~he act of suicide cannot then be said to be willful or intentional within
the meaning of the statute since its causation ultimately relates back to the
original injury, rather than existing as an independent and intervening cause.
Id. at 86, 156 N.W.2d at 501.
23. E.g., Konazewska v. Erie R.R., 132 N.J.L. 424, 41 A.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
24. Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P.2d 364
(1952); McFarland v. Department of Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d 714
(1936); Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Indus., 185 Wash. 628, 56 P.2d 693
(1936).
25. Mercer v. Department of Labor & Indus., 74 Wash. 2d 96, 442 P.2d 1000
(1968). A decedent who was injured at work suffered a painful infection and under-
went several operations before committing suicide. The court held that the death was
compensable only if decedent acted under an incontrollable impulse or while in a
delirium, and this could only be established by competent medical evidence.
26. 76 Wash. 2d 784, 459 P.2d 1 (1969).
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earlier,2 7 but the Court on that occasion had been able to decline to go
into the question whether Sponatski was out of date, since the first ap-
peal could be disposed of by a mere holding that there was evidence to
take the case to the jury even within the law as laid down in existing
decisions.
The decedent in Schwab had had a history of alcoholism and
mental instability for some years before his injury and also had made
as many as four to eight suicide attempts. He had sustained a com-
pensable back injury, as a result of which he continued to have pain
in his back and legs. There was medical testimony that his condition
could probably no longer be helped by surgery, and that the only
problem was how to obtain relief from pain. After the injury, decedent
made two additional attempts to commit suicide, and then on the
third attempt succeeded, through the use of an overdose of sleeping
pills. The two doctors, a psychiatrist and a general practitioner, who
were witnesses for claimant testified that the back injury was proba-
bly the "major contributing cause" and the "triggering cause"
of the suicide. They testified that "his defenses were down" so that
his suicidal tendencies controlled his actions.
In affirming an award, the Supreme Court of Washington re-
viewed the earlier Washington cases and concluded:
This review of our prior decisions on the questions at hand indi-
cates that while we started with and adhere to the requirement of a
direct causal relationship between a workman's industrial injury,
insanity, and resulting self-destruction, we have tended to lean away
from characterizing, in the traditional tort sense, volitional or con-
scious suicidal acts as an independent intervening cause precluding
compensation. Rather, it appears that we have inclined more toward
looking upon ROW 51.32.020 as erecting a statutory bar between
cause and a proximately related result. Likewise, it would appear
that we have broadened, somewhat, the concept, found in In re
Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915), that an injury occa-
sioned suicidal death to be compensable must occur from an uncon-
trollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy without conscious voli-
tion to produce death, by extending it to include irresistible impulse,
delirium caused by injury related drugs, pain, and suffering and/or
other forms of acute dementia, any of which render the injured work-
man incapable, at the pertinent time, of forming a volitional and
deliberate intent to commit suicide.
2 8
27. Schwab v. Department of Labor & Indus., 69 Wash. 2d 111, 417 P.2d 613(1966).
28. 76 Wash. at 791-92, 459 P.2d at 5-6.
49.
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Where does this leave the rule in Washington? Perhaps the most
significant feature of the case is what the court did, rather than what
it said. When a man has made four to eight attempts to commit sui-
cide before his injury, and three after his injury, with the last taking
the most quiet and undramatic form of all, an overdose of sleeping
pills, it requires some strain to equate the fact situation with the
Sponatski picture of a man, maddened by hot lead splashed in his
eye, jumping from a window. The willful intent to commit suicide
seems to have been present in Schwab not just once but three times
following injury, and perhaps a dozen times in all. In this one case,
then, we seem to see the knowledge-of-consequences component of
Sponatski jettisoned altogether, and the uncontrollable-impulse com-
ponent stripped of its "delirium of frenzy" connotations and given an
interpretation essentially related to causation.
In Minnesota, two cases decided in 1960 are also notable for the
absence of real Sponatski substance accompanying the lip service paid
by Minnesota to the Sponatski doctrine. In Anderson v. Armour &
Co.,29 a truckdriver underwent a psychotic depression after hitting
a pedestrian in the course of his employment. One week after the
accident, he slashed his wrists. The court held that "one may commit
an act knowing it was wrong and with full realization of its conse-
quences, yet the act may be the result of insanity rather than the
individual's own conscious act." 30 Nothing could be a plainer dis-
avowal of the first component of Sponatski than this reference to "full
realization" of the consequences of the act, and to "knowing it was
wrong." The court found that the suicide was the result of an un-
controllable impulse, the implication being that this in itself satis-
fied Sponatski. Note that here there was no "delirium of frenzy," no
spectacular act of self-destruction, not even an initial traumatic injury
-only a week of psychotic depression followed by a slashing of wrists.
In the second case, Olson v. F. L Crane Lumber Co.,31 not only
the knowledge-of-consequences component but even the irresistible-
impulse component seems to have disappeared. The claimant, after
a compensable heart attack, became extremely depressed and soon
developed mental illness, which deteriorated to the point where he
was severely disoriented. He imagined that people were trying to
29. 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960).
30. Id. at 289, 101 N.W.2d at 440.
31. 259 Minn. 248, 107 N.W.2d 223 (1960).
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harm him, and that the Devil was after him. He committed suicide
by strangulation. The court affirmed an award on the ground that the
suicide was caused by a "psychotic reaction," which was in turn caused
by the work-related heart attack. The decision is difficult to dis-
tinguish, both in approach and in result, from decisions produced
in chain-of-causation states, but it should be pointed out that Minne-
sota has subsequently asserted that Sponatski is still the law in Minne-
sota.32
Two federal cases have also demonstrably carved out of Sponatski
all trace of the knowledge-of-consequences component. In a Fifth
Circuit decision applying the Longshoremen's Act,33 it seems clear
from the facts that the employee was aware that his action would
produce death. Nevertheless the court, in effect making Sponatski
synonymous with "irresistible impulse," said that the case would be
compensable under either Sponatski or the chain-of-causation test.
Similarly, in another federal case arising under the Longshoremen's
Act,34 the court said, after describing both the Sponatski and chain-of-
causation rules, that "it is sufficient for the purposes of our case" to
state that if the injury caused a mental disease or defect which in turn
was responsible for the employee's impulse to take his own life, and
so far impaired the ability to resist that impulse that the decedent
was in fact unable to control it, the suicide could not be termed willful
under the act.
Other jurisdictions occupying the in-between ground,35 in which
32. Lehman v. A. V. Winterer Co., 272 Minn. 79, 136 N.W.2d 649 (1965)
(dictum). See also Cooley v. Construction Laborers Local Union, 287 Minn. 559, 178
N.W.2d 697 (1970). Decedent suffered a heart attack followed by depression, com-
pounded by loss of employment, loss of wages, and charges of defalcation. The Com-
mission decision denying compensation was affirmed.
33. Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952). The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(b) (1970), contains a defense of causation "solely" by the
willful intention of the employee to kill or injure himself. It is interesting to note
that the court expressed a definite preference for the chain-of-causation rule.
34. Terminal Shipping Co. v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 915 (D. Md. 1965).
35. Another noncommittal position is that since the facts would come within
either Sponatski or the chain-of-causation test, the court is not obliged to consider
whether Sponatski should be liberalized. This was the position followed in Jackson
Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Slover, 102 Ind. App. 145, 199 N.E. 417 (1936), in which
the facts actually showed that the employee could not tell right from wrong, and did
not know whether he was killing himself. See also Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n,
190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1951). Maryland has also taken a noncommittal stance, but
with a preference for the chain-of-causation rule. In Baber v. John C. Knipp & Sons,
164 Md. 55, 163 A. 862 (1933), the chain-of-causation test was quoted with approval,
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Sponatski is bent in varying ways without being avowedly broken, in-
clude Ohio36 and Pennsylvania.37
II. CHAIN-OF-CAUSATION TEST
It is quite possible to accept the legal principle of independent
intervening cause as the controlling issue in these cases and still, as
the original British decisions38 and the majority of modern American
decisions 9 have done, hold that the intervening cause issue turns not
but since the case turned solely on the causal connection between the injury and the
brain derangement, it was not necessary to adopt the test specifically in order to decide
the case.
36. For a time, Ohio appeared to apply a test similar to Sponatski. See, e.g., In-
dustrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935). Whether the de-
cedent was so insane that he could not entertain a "fixed purpose" to take his own
life was the determinative issue. But a jury charge reflecting a substantially different
rule was approved in Burnett v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ohio App. 441, 93 N.E.2d
41 (1949). The approved charge required only that the employee's mind be so de-
ranged that he killed himself "wholly without his own volition." This instruction obvi-
ously puts the entire stress on the element of "will." The conspicuous absence of any
reference to lack of knowledge of the consequences of the act appears to put Ohio
in line with the trend toward eliminating the "understanding" component of Sponat-
ski. The decision was not, however, one by Ohio's court of last resort, and consequently
the Ohio position is still somewhat uncertain.
37. See Gasperin v. Consolidation Coal Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 A. 187 (1928)
(seems to apply the chain-of-causation test); Berdy v. Glen Alden Corp., 202 Pa. Super.
525, 198 A.2d 329 (1964) (suicide held not causally related to silicosis); Zimmiski v.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 200 Pa. Super. 524, 189 A.2d 897 (1963); Kasman v. Hill-
man Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d 762 (1942).
In Blasczak v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193 Pa. Super. 422, 165 A.2d 128 (1960),
the employee hanged himself four and one-half months after a compensable loss of a
leg. The Pennsylvania rule requires a showing of "uncontrollable insane impulse" to
defeat the statutory defense of intentional self-injury. Although the employee seemed
normal on the day of hanging, one psychiatrist testified that the employee was "out of
his mind." On the strength of his testimony, an award was affirmed.
38. King v. Blades, 69 York Leg. Rec. 97 (1955). Compensation was awarded
for a suicide on evidence only that decedent was severely nervous and depressed, with-
out even finding the existence of a psychosis. The court squeezed the case within the
Sponatski rule by observing that it was inconceivable that anyone not in the grip of
an uncontrollable impulse would kill himself in such a violent way, shooting himself
with a shotgun. Indeed, the court questioned whether a sane person would ever com-
mit suicide. See Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Co., 13 B.W.C.C. 353 (1920);
Graham v. Christie, 10 B.W.C.C. 486 (Scot. 1916).
39. Arizona: Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Ariz. 256, 399
P.2d 664 (1965). Claimant was in continuous pain following a compensable accident
and, as a result, shot himself. The court criticized In re Sponatski, and said the test
should be that when the work-connected injuries suffered by the employee result in his
becoming both devoid of normal judgment and dominated by a disturbance of mind
directly caused by his injury and its consequences, the self-inflicted injury cannot be
considered "purposeful" and should be compensable. Baxter v. Industrial Comm'n, 6
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Ariz. App. 156, 430 P.2d 735 (1967). Decedent suffered several back injuries, and
over a period of eight years had several operations and severe pain, and used drugs to
excess. On the day of his death, decedent was speeding in his car, and after a long
chase was finally stopped by a deputy sheriff. Decedent pulled out a gun, and after
making several threats was shot by the deputy. His actions were caused by either an
unconscious suicide wish or a sham aggression, both of which had their roots in the
earlier injuries. The court held that in this case, as in suicide cases, the employment
caused the death, and therefore a denial of death benefits was error.
California: Beauchamp v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 259 Cal. App.
2d 147, 66 Cal. Rptr. 352 (2d Dist. 1968). Decedent, a teacher, suffered a back injury,
and became unable to teach full time. He lost his job, and was only able to find work
as a substitute. A short time after being denied reconsideration of an award which
he considered inadequate, decedent committed suicide. There was no evidence that
decedent did not know what he was doing, but the psychiatrist testified that the
injury and loss of work caused a state of hopelessness, and without the injury decedent
would not have committed suicide. Denial of death benefits reversed. Burnight v. In-
dustrial Acc. Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1st Dist. 1960).
Connecticut: Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 A. 644 (1927).
Florida: Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949).
Illinois: Harper v. Industrial Comm'n, 24 Ill. 2d 103, 180 N.E.2d 480 (1962). A
"friendly, sociable man with a 'jolly' disposition" suffered mental depression after a
severe back injury and ultimately committed suicide. The court took note of theories
based on volition or willfulness, but, in the absence of a specific Illinois provision making
suicide a defense, held the suicidal death compensable.
Massachusetts: See statutory amendment cited note 22 supra. The statute was ap-
plied in Oberlander's Case, 348 Mass. 1, 200 N.E.2d 268 (1964), in which the court
observed that the amendment was "unquestionably" inspired by Sponatski.
Michigan: Trombley v. Coldwater State Home & Training School, 366 Mich. 649,
115 N.W.2d 561 (1962).
Mississippi: Prentiss Truck & Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So. 2d
272 (1956). Depression subsequent to a back injury was deemed to be a result of that
injury and impaired the reasoning faculties to such an extent that the act of self-
destruction was not voluntary and willful within the meaning of the statute.
New York: New York generally follows the chain-of-causation rule. What is some-
times identified as a distinctive New York rule goes to the nature of the requisite "brain
derangement," not to the causal principle. See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
Cases applying the basic chain-of-causation approach include the following:
Falso v. National Wiring & Protective Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 667, 230 N.Y.S.2d 164
(3d Dep't. 1962). Blow on employee's head causally related to suicide eleven years later;
compensation awarded.
McIntosh v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 406, 211 N.Y.S.2d 482 (3d
Dep't), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 892, 179 N.E.2d 514, 223 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1961). For a dis-
cussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
The same test is applied in denials. Estate of Vernum v. State Univ., 4 App. Div.
2d 722, 163 N.Y.S.2d 727 (3d Dep't 1957). Compensation denied because the suicidal
act six months after heart attack was not the product of mental disease which resulted
from the compensable injury.
Maricle v. Glazier, 283 App. Div. 402, 128 N.Y.S.2d 148 (3d Dep't), aft'd, 307
N.Y. 738, 121 N.E.2d 549 (1954). Award sustained without mention of the issue of
knowledge of the nature of the act.
Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div. 875, 88 N.Y.S.2d 885 (3d Dep't
1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 637, 90 N.E.2d 494 (1950). This case affirmed an award on a
finding that due to certain physical injuries "the decedent was caused to suffer from a
depressive psychosis and that he attempted suicide"-with no discussion of the issue
of knowing the nature of the act.
North Carolina: Petty v. Associated Transp. Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321
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on the employee's knowledge that he is killing himself, but rather on
the existence of an unbroken chain of causation from the injury to
the suicide. In one of the pioneering American statements of this
position, Judge Fowler, dissenting in Barber v. Industrial Commis-
sion,40 argued along lines which have always been considered sound
proximate cause doctrine, that if the first cause produces the second
cause, that second cause is not an independent intervening cause.
The question whether the actor appreciated the consequences of his
act should not be decisive of the fundamental question whether that
act was the natural and foreseeable result of the first injury. To say
that it was not such a result, one must take the position that it is un-
foreseeable that a man in unbearable pain will knowingly take his
own life.41 That position is simply untenable, and if any evidence is
needed, the number of compensation cases presenting these facts
should be proof enough. If the sole motivation controlling the will of
the employee when he knowingly decides to kill himself is the pain and
despair caused by the injury, and if the will itself is deranged and
disordered by these consequences of the injury, then it seems wrong
to say that this exercise of will is "independent," or that it breaks
the chain of causation. Rather, it seems to be in the direct line of
causation. 42
An effective statement of this theme may be found in the Cali-
fornia case of Burnight v. Industrial Accident Commission.43 The de-
cedent, who had a prior history of manic depressive psychosis, suffered
(1970). Decedent suffered a compensable injury and became extremely depressed as
a result of his physical problems and the need for surgery. About five months after
the accident, decedent committed suicide. His widow's claim for death benefits was
initially denied on grounds that the death was occasioned by decedent's willful and
premeditated intention to kill himself. After a thorough review of suicide cases, the
court rejected the Sponatski rule, and held that an employee who becomes mentally
deranged and deprived of normal judgment as a result of a compensable accident and
commits suicide does not act willfully so as to require a denial of benefits. The opinion
by Justice Sharp contains a good review of the development of the law on this point,
tracing the gradual abandonment in other jurisdictions of the Sponatski rule and the
increasing acceptance of the chain-of-causation test. Painter v. Mead Corp., 258
N.C. 741, 129 S.E.2d 482 (1963). Painter suffered increasing insane-depression-psy-
chosis after a head injury and hanged himself. The court specifically rejected "the rigid
rule of the Sponatski case" and awarded compensation.
Wisconsin: Brenne v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 38 Wis.
2d 84, 156 N.W.2d 497 (1968).
40. 241 Wis. 462, 466, 6 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1942).
41. On the ability of pain to break down rational mental processes, see C. MORoAN,
PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (1943).
42. Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949).
43. 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1st Dist. 1960).
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a number of frustrations and difficulties in the course of trying to su-
pervise construction of a paint plant in Mexico. He began to display
symptoms such as palpitations, night sweats, and indecision, and
finally was given medical and psychiatric attention and was even hos-
pitalized. After his discharge, he registered in a cheap hotel and
slashed his wrists. An award of compensation was upheld. The court
said:
Modem psychiatry knows that a manic depressive condition oper-
ates to break down rational mental processes, placing the person
afflicted in a mental state in which death actually seems more at-
tractive than living, and in which he may not only have a con-
scious volition to produce death, but be eager to do so. 44
The court continued:
It is unreasonable and unrealistic to hold that suicide occurring
when the employee is in such a state is not the result of the indus-
trial injury when the manic depressive state is. If suicide is a result
which may be expected from a manic depressive condition, how can
such a result be said to be intentionally self-inflicted, even though the
person may know what he is doing and its results? The manic de-
pressive condition provides the irresistible impulse. Mere realization
of the nature and effect of the suicidal act cannot be controlling. 45
The New York cases for some years appear in effect to have
adopted the chain-of-causation test, by virtue of making awards in
which a simple statement that the injury caused the mental disorder
from which suicide followed has seemed to suffice. 46 The emphasis is
on a showing of genuine brain derangement-as distinguished from
mere melancholy, discouragement, or other sane conditions47 -aided
44. Id. at 826, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
45. Id. at 827, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
46. See New York cases cited note 39 supra.
47. Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431 (1928). For
other cases applying the Delinousha rule, see: Consula v. Harrison, 16 App. Div. 2d
848, 227 N.Y.S.2d 585 (3d Dep't 1962); Cackett v. General Acc. Fire & Life Ins. Co.,
9 App. Div. 2d. 804, 192 N.Y.S.2d 646 (3d Dep't 1959); Deitz v. William H. Bum-
stead, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 739, 168 N.Y.S.2d 669 (3d Dep't 1957); Nohe v. Shef-
field Farms Co., 4 App. Div. 2d 711, 163 N.Y.S.2d 455 (3d Dep't 1957); Levita v.
Plymouth Rock Provision Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 784, 160 N.Y.S.2d 59 (3d Dep't 1957);
Sulfaro v. A. Pellegrino & Sons, 2 App. Div. 2d 426, 156 N.Y.S.2d 411 (3d Dep't
1956); Seal v. Effron Fuel Oil Co., 284 App. Div. 795, 135 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't
1954).
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by but not entirely dependent on 48 medical testimony49 without at-
tempting to test the exact form or degree of the derangement by the
old Sponatski formula of "voluntary willful choice" and "knowledge
of nature of the act."
Louisiana appears to have adopted the New York rule in the case
of Soileau v. Travelers Insurance Co.r0 Decedent suffered a com-
pensable injury, and later committed suicide. The testimony tended
to show that the deceased was neurotic, and took her life as a re-
sult of depression or melancholy. Death benefits were denied, the
court stating that in order for benefits to be payable, it must be
shown that the suicidal act was the product of some form of insanity,
mental disease, mental derangement, or psychosis, which resulted
from the injury.
Similarly, in England it was never enough to show mere brood-
ing or depression. 51 There must have been actual "insanity," which
might be negated by such circumstances as the leaving of a rational
note showing a deliberate and reasoned decision that suicide was the
best course.52
48. McIntosh v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 123 App. Div. 2d 406, 211 N.Y.S.2d 482(3d Dep't 1961). See Cackett v. General Acc. Fire & Life Ins. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 804,
192 N.Y.S.2d 646 (3d Dep't 1959).
49. Franzoni v. Loew's Theatre Realty Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 741, 253 N.Y.S.2d
505 (3d Dep't 1964). Decedent had suffered two compensable injuries. As a result, he
developed a depressed state which led to his death by suicide. The court denied com-
pensation, holding that the suicide must be caused by brain derangement or psychosis
and not mere depression.
Falso v. National Wiring & Protective Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 667, 230 N.Y.S.2d
164 (3d Dep't 1962). Psychiatric medical testimony indicated that a compensable blow
on the employee's head in 1947 was causally related to his suicide eleven years later.
Compensation award affirmed.
Maricle v. Glazier, 283 App. Div. 402, 128 N.Y.S.2d 148 (3d Dep't 1954). On
October 14, 1949, deceased sustained a compensable inguinal hernia. A successful
operation was performed on October 28, and deceased went home from hospital on
November 4. He committed suicide on November 30. Award was based on finding
that the injury with the resultant effects and operation caused him to develop a de-
pressive psychosis, and while suffering from the psychosis he committed suicide.
50. 198 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 1967).
51. Withers v. London, B. & S.C.R.R., [1916] 2 K.B. 772.
52. Bevan v. Lancasters Steam Coal Collieries, 20 B.W.C.C. 241 (1927). See also
Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa. Super. 612, 84 A.2d 259 (1951). Parts
of two fingers of employee were amputated by a cutting machine, and six days later
he committed suicide. Court rejected contention that he killed himself in a fit of de-
pression as a result of the accident because his suicide notes did not reveal a de-
ranged mind.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
III. ORIGIN IN WORK-CONNECTED INJURY
Although it is sometimes said that the suicide must stem from a
"compensable physical injury,15 3 this statement is unduly restrictive.
The correct statement is that the suicide must be the result of some
injury arising out of and in the course of employment. In other
words, at the very outset an injury must be found which itself arose
out of and in the course of employment, to which the suicide is di-
rectly traceable.54 If there is no such employment-connected injury
setting in motion the causal sequence leading to the suicide, or if
there are far stronger non-employment influences accounting for the
suicide,55 the suicide is a complete defense. Thus, when an employee
was observed running through the plant clutching his head in pain,
and was later found to have thrown himself out of a window, com-
pensation was denied because there was no industrial injury as the
initial cause. 0 The same holding followed when the evidence showed
53. In re Oberlander's Case, 348 Mass. 1, 200 N.E.2d 268 (1964). Decedent
committed suicide. He had received a compensable injury to one hand 11 years be-
fore. For the two years previous to his death he had developed a dislike for out-of-
town work, and had lost his job as a result. It was held that claimant had not estab-
lished that the death was caused by a compensable personal injury.
White v. Kitty Clover Co., 409 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1965). Claimant committed sui-
cide after being involved in a slight traffic accident from which he received no injuries.
He had a long history of mental problems and at best the accident was merely a
"triggering mechanism." Compensation denied, on ground that there was no physical
injury involved in the accident.
54. Seal v. Effron Fuel Oil Corp., 284 App. Div. 795, 797, 135 N.Y.S.2d 231,
233 (3d Dep't 1954): "Remorse and depression are not sufficient for awarding com-
pensation if they are not primarily caused by the accident, but are due to tendencies
which long antedated the accident." Decedent had been a person of unstable, violent,
and assaultive disposition long before his accident which injured his back. Hence,
compensation denied for his suicide by hanging himself in jail where he had been
committed for assaulting his wife. Berdy v. Glen Alden Corp., 202 Pa. Super. 525, 198
A.2d 329 (1964). Suicide not causally related to silicosis. Compensation denied.
55. Consula v. Town of Harrison, 16 App. Div. 2d 848, 227 N.Y.S.2d 585 (3d
Dep't 1962). Employee committed suicide five years after suffering a herniated disc.
His reactive depression was traced to the death of his sister rather than the back
injury. Compensation denied.
Of course, in line with the general rule compensating aggravation of prior weak-
nesses (see 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKIFEN'S COAIPENSATION, § 12.20 (1972))
the fact that there was a history of mental or nervous trouble prior to the injury is
not in itself a defense; indeed, this feature is present in a considerable number of suc-
cessful cases. See, e.g., Burnight v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5
Cal. Rptr. 786 (1st Dist. 1960); Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 A.
644 (1927); King v. Blades, 69 York Leg. Rec. 97 (1955).
56. Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N.Y.S. 700 (3d
Dep't 1921).
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nothing but the impetuous drinking of a bottle of acid during work-
ing hours.57 And, in another case, evidence of a relatively trivial
injury-getting dust in the eye-which required only first-aid treat-
ment, did not suffice to supply the necessary industrial link to suicide
three months later, although the workman had acted a little strange
at the time of the mishap. 5
This does not mean, however, that it is necessary to show that the
first injury resulted in the kind of disability that would in itself have
technically entitled the claimant to compensation. For example, in
Wilder v. Russell Library Co.,59 a librarian suffered a physical
and nervous breakdown due to overwork and worry and committed
suicide when her condition developed into insanity. Although there
was a history of predisposition to mental trouble in her family, com-
pensation was awarded on the ground that the suicide was the direct
result of the employment. Similarly, in Trombley v. State of Michigan0
an employee of the Coldwater State Home and Training School had
been questioned by a legislative committee which was investigating
the death of a patient at the Home. He heard on the evening news
broadcast that the committee was preparing to continue the investi-
gation. Up to that time, the employee "had felt aggrieved" by the
accusations made against him, but merely "threw up his hands and
went to bed" on hearing the latest news. The next day he slipped out
of the house, drove a mile to a secluded spot, and shot himself with a
rifle. Compensation was affirmed by an equally divided court.0 1
At this writing, there are few such examples of suicide preceded
by no definite physical injury.62 But the rapid development of the
57. Shewczuk v. Contrexeville Mfg. Co., 53 R.I. 223, 165 A. 444 (1933). See also
Lopez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 71 Ariz. 212, 225 P.2d 702 (1950) (evidence was
held to support a finding that claimant tried to blow himself up for no known reason).
58. Veloz v. Fidelity-Union Cas. Co., 8 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
59. 107 Conn. 56, 139 A. 644 (1927).
60. 366 Mich. 649, 115 N.W.2d 561 (1962).
61. Three judges would have reversed because "it may not be said that his act
was committed in a moment of insane frenzy or as the result of an irresistible or un-
controllable impulse." Id. at 661, 115 N.W.2d at 567. The three affirming justices
rejected the theory of the Sponatski case and affirmed compensation on the grounds
that "Trombley's mental disorder was caused by the legislative committee's investiga-
tion and that it so impaired his reasoning facilities that his act of suicide was not voluntary
and, therefore, not intentional or willful within the meaning of the statutory provi-
sion." Id. at 671, 115 N.W.2d at 571.
62. The two leading cases, in addition to those cited in the text, resulting'in sui-
cide awards in the absence of physical injury are Burnight v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1st Dist. 1960); Anderson v. Armour & Co.,
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field of compensation for nervous and mental disorders63 suggests
that as cases of suicide following a mental or nervous injury arise,
awards will not be refused merely for lack of evidence of a com-
pensable physical injury at some point.
IV. EVIDENCE AS TO MENTAL IMBALANCE
An increasingly common feature of suicide cases is the presence
of expert testimony on the extent of the derangement of the de-
cedent's mind.64 In many of the earlier cases, the judgment on de-
cedent's lack of volition was apt to be an inference from the objective
facts of his conduct, and, as indicated earlier, the more violent and
bizarre his suicide, the more likely it was that adequate derangement
would be found. In current cases it is frequently possible to have more
direct evidence bearing on the abnormality of the decedent's mental
condition. In some cases there is an actual history of confinement in
psychiatric hospitals6 5 or mental institutions.66 There may be a known
history of progressive mental deterioration6 7 or use of drugs and ex-
cessive drinking to kill the pain.68 In several cases, the decisive ele-
ment in the decision appears to have been the presence 69 or absence
7 0
257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W. 435 (1960). Contra, Federal Rice Drug Co. v. Queen Ins. Co.
of America, 463 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1972), holding that suicide from emotional stress
caused by verbal harassment would not be compensable under the Pennsylvania statute.
Note that this was an "upside-down" case, in the sense that the effect of the holding was to
take the case out of the workmen's compensation exclusion clause in the employer's
comprehensive business liability policy.
63. For a discussion of the current development of compensation for mental and
nervous injuries, see Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workman's Compensation,
23 VAND. L. REv. 1243 (1970).
64. See, e.g., Burnight v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 786 (1st Dist. 1960), particularly the first quotation, in the text accompanying
note 44 supra.
65. Burnight v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786
(Ist Dist. 1960); Sulfaro v. Pellegrino & Sons, 2 App. Div. 2d 426, 156 N.Y.S.2d 411
(3d Dep't 1956) (industrial accident caused degeneration of employee's brain requir-
ing confinement in psychiatric hospitals. Suicide two years after the accident com-
pensable).
66. Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P.2d 364
(1952).
67. Olson v. F.I. Crane Lumber Co., 259 Minn. 248, 107 N.W.2d 223 (1960).
68. Kelly v. Sugarman, 5 App. Div. 2d 1023, 173 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1959).
69. See, e.g., Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 95 N.W.2d 40 (1959); Blasczak
v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193 Pa. Super. 422, 165 A.2d 128 (1960); Falso v. Na-
tional Wire & Protective Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 667, 230 N.Y.S.2d 164 (3d Dep't 1962);
Maricle v. Glazier, 283 App. Div. 402, 128 N.Y.S.2d 148 (3d Dep't 1954).
70. Palmer v. Redman, 281 App. Div. 723, 117 N.Y.S.2d 708 (3d Dep't 1952)
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of expert testimony supporting a finding of mental imbalance as dis-
tinguished from mere depression.
This is not to say that expert testimony is absolutely indispensa-
ble in this class of cases; if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently
persuasive, they may carry the burden of establishing the requisite
causal nexus.7 1 In McIntosh v. E.F. Hauserman Co.,72 there was med-
ical testimony, but it was in sharp conflict. The facts, however, were
unusually strong. In 1954, the employee had sustained an electric
shock, a fall from a ladder, a fractured skull, and a subdural hema-
toma in two regions of the brain. The employee then underwent a
craniotomy. There followed a steady mental depression, coupled with
convulsions of such severity as to have resulted in fractured verte-
brae. The employee lost sexual interest, and became irritable and
suspicious. Marked changes were observed in his personality, and his
judgment displayed signs of impairment. Two and a half months after
his accident he fell while emerging from a tavern and bled copiously
from several lacerations. That evening he shot himself. The court
held that the sequence of events from the original injury to the time
of the suicide "speaks louder than any medical testimony as to the
insidious breakdown of the man's mental and physical capabilities." 73
V. SELF-INJURY OTHER THAN SUICIDE
The defense of intentional self-injury, as distinguished from the
specific defense of suicide, has produced virtually no law of signifi-
cance in death cases. The only uses that seem to have been made of
(board's finding that death of claimant's husband by suicide was a result of mental
derangement brought on by accidental injuries was reversed because the only doctor
who testified refused to say that the decedent's mental balance had been affected,
though he did state that the decedent had undergone a change of personality and had
become mentally depressed as a result of the injuries).
In Estate of Vernum v. State Univ., 4 App. Div. 2d 722, 163 N.Y.S.2d 727 (3d
Dep't 1957), compensation was denied because it was not shown that the suicidal act
was the product of some form of mental disease which resulted from the compensable
injury. Hence, the suicide was attributed to the decedent's own volitional act, which
constituted an independent intervening cause. The deceased, following a heart attack,
had become despondent and discouraged, and about six months after the injury had
committed suicide.
Mercer v. Department of Labor & Indus., 74 Wash. 2d 96, 442 P.2d 1000 (1968).
71. On the general question of ability of non-medical evidence to sustain an
award, see 3 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 79.51 (1971).
72. 12 App. Div. 2d 406, 211 N.Y.S.2d 482 (3d Dep't 1961).
73. Id. at 409, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
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this defense have been fictitious. For example, in a Fifth Circuit case 4
the evidence showed that the deceased had been warned by his physi-
cian that, if he engaged in hard work, it might cause his death. There
was, of course, no evidence of real intent on decedent's part to injure
himself, and compensation was accordingly awarded.
In one of the rare cases in which the self-injury defense was seri-
ously urged, a Georgia court disposed of the issue by applying the
chain-of-causation test drawn from suicide cases.75 Decedent had had
a moderate drinking problem before his accident, but it was found
that due to a combination of his pain, enforced idleness, and appre-
hension of surgery, the drinking problem was aggravated, and re-
sulted in his death from alcoholic gastritis. The court held that the
defense of intoxication was not applicable, in that intoxication was
the medical cause of death, rather than the cause of the accident. The
court further held that the proper test was to apply the "intentionally
self-inflicted injury test" as a defense, and adopted what it characterized
as the Arizona test"6 for compensable suicides, holding such a death
compensable if the suicide, or alcoholic problem, resulted from the
decedent's becoming devoid of normal judgment.
VI. PRESUMPTIONs AFFECTING THE SUICIDE DEFENSE
Up to this point, it has been assumed that the fact of suicide has
been established and that the only issue has been causal connection.
In a considerable number of instances, however, the key issue may be
whether there was a suicide at all, rather than an accidental fall or
other injury.
The starting point in most of these cases is the presumption
against suicide. So strong is this universally accepted presumption that
awards have been made in a number of cases in which there was a
substantial amount of evidence from which suicide could have been
inferred. Thus, in a Florida case,77 an employee was found asphyxiated
by chlorine gas in the chlorinating room near the club's swimming
pool. His death certificate actually indicated suicide, apparently partly
74. Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Henderson, 212 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1954).
75. Bullington v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 122 Ga. App. 842, 178 S.E.2d 901,
rev'd on other grounds, 227 Ga. 485, 181 S.E.2d 495 (1971).
76. See Arizona cases cited note 39 supra.
77. Olsen v. Winter Park Racquet Club, 142 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1962).
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because the windows were all closed. On the other hand, evidence of
a satisfactory marital life, of the fact that the employee might have
had an employment reason to be in the room, and of the possibility
that the gas leakage could have been accidental were held sufficient to
sustain the presumption against suicide. In a Michigan case, 78 death
from cyanide poisoning shortly after the decedent arrived home from
work was held compensable, since cyanide was used in the employer's
plant, about 420 feet from the decedent's work location. The pre-
sumption against suicide, and the fact that cyanide is not publicly
used, supported the inference that injury arose in the course of em-
ployment. But when an experienced automobile mechanic was found
asphyxiated by carbon monoxide in the gas station, with all the doors
locked, and with two automobile engines running-which was un-
necessary to the type of repair work to be done-the presumption
against suicide was held overcome.79
In a few jurisdictions, the general presumption against suicide
may be reenforced by a particular statutory presumption of compensa-
bility, as in New York,80 which may be applicable only in cases of
death or inability to testify, as in Massachusetts. 81 So, in New York, we
78. Zytkewick v. Ford Motor Co., 340 Mich. 309, 65 N.W.2d 813 (1954). See
also Sutter v. Industrial Comm'n, 4 Ariz. App. 392, 420 P.2d 964 (1966). Decedent had
been in a tuberculosis sanitarium, which had caused financial hardship to his family.
He returned to work, and was found burned to death in his car outside of the shop
yard. The evidence tended to show that he had filled his car with gas and started
up, and then the fire started. It was shown that filling the tank in his particular type
of car often resulted in spilled gas, and that there was a jar of gas in the car which
the men often carried to prime the pump. The court held that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to overcome the presumption against suicide, and a denial of death benefits was
error.
79. Industrial Comm'n v. Peterson, 151 Colo. 289, 377 P.2d 542 (1963).
80.
In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation
under this chapter, it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary
1. That the claim comes within the provision of this chapter ....
3. That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the
injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another.
N.Y. WORKMEN'S CONIPENSATION LAW § 21 (McKinney 1965).
81. The Massachusetts statute provides:
In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed,
or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within
the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been
given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the willful inten-
tion of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 7A (1947).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
observe two strong presumptions, a statutory presumption of compen-
sation coverage and a common law and statutory presumption against
suicide, teamed together and pulling in the same direction. The re-
sult has been to sustain awards in some fact situations presenting what
might otherwise, to put it mildly, seem persuasive evidence of suicide.
In the Wetterauw case,8 2 two witnesses said they saw the employee run
from the middle of the station platform and throw himself in front
of the subway train. The New York Court of Appeals awarded com-
pensation, reversing the lower court's denial based on a finding of
suicide. Subsequently, instructed by this reversal, the appellate divi-
sion awarded compensation where there was not only testimony of a
railroad engineer and a fireman that the decedent had jumped or
dived in front of the train on a clear, bright day shortly after the
engineer had blown the crossing warning, but also evidence that the
decedent had been under medical care for strain, had been taking
tranquilizers on doctor's orders, and had just announced his forth-
coming resignation from work "because the pressure was too great."
The board and the court held that the presumption against suicide
had not been overcome.8 3
The line of New York cases establishing this very strong pre-
sumption against suicide in unexplained-death cases appears to date
from the 1954 court of appeals decision in the Graham case.8 4 The
82. 11 N.Y.2d 983, 229 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1962), reo'g 14 App. Div. 2d 638, 218
N.Y.S.2d 299 (3d Dep't 1961).
83. Phillips v. Spaulding Bakeries, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 684, 230 N.Y.S.2d 786
(3d Dep't 1961).
84. 308 N.Y. 140, 123 N.E.2d 813 (1954), rev'g 283 App. Div. 228, 126 N.Y.S.2d
666 (3d Dep't 1953) (4-3 decision).
Other cases finding the evidence inadequate to overcome the presumption against
suicide include:
Mengele v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc., 11 N.Y.2d 986, 229 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1962).
There was evidence of depression two years before, of an extreme nervous state two
weeks before, and the impossibility of an accidental fall over a 52-inch-high con-
crete wall around the roof. The court reinstated the original award on the ground that
the record presented only an issue of fact. Two judges dissented.
Story v. Continental Baking Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 607, 222 N.Y.S.2d 404 (3d
Dep't 1961). There was evidence that the employee was depressed and worried. The
facts showed an apparent fall from the roof of a building.
Gallagher v. Steers & Morrison-Knudsen, 12 App. Div. 2d, 830, 209 N.Y.S.2d 393
(3d Dep't 1961). The employee's body was found in a courtyard 39Y2 feet from the
vertical plane of the washroom window on the 27th floor where the employee was last
seen.
In re Ackerman's Claim, 10 App. Div. 2d 112, 197 N.Y.S.2d 674 (3d Dep't
1960). Decedent had written letters to his superiors one to four days before death
about "all the heartache I am going to cause." The employee's body and an employer-
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decedent in that case, whose regular duties were those of a super-
visor and did not include adjusting the superheater where his death
occurred, told one of his crew to shut down the apparatus. He then
climbed to the top of the heater stack where there was a platform
from which the cover of the stack was sometimes adjusted. After that
no one saw what happened, but he was found burned to death with
his feet projecting out of the heater stack. Decedent himself was only
19 inches taller than the heater stack-a fact which weighed heavily
with the appellate division in its finding of suicide. On the other hand,
there was evidence that it would have been easier to adjust the stack
cover by climbing to one of the horizontal sections of the guard rail
on the platform, and that this practice was quite common. There was
evidence that decedent's wife had recently obtained an interlocutory
decree of divorce, and that decedent had been quiet and moody on
the morning of his death. The decision reversing the denial of com-
pensation shows that the burden of overcoming the presumption
against suicide is indeed a heavy one, as long as there is any other
reasonable explanation for the sequence of events leading up to the
death. Here the decedent might have decided to do the job of ad-
justing the cover himself, although he apparently had never done it
furnished car were found in a pond 1 /2 miles north of his home. The court held that
the presumption of suicide does more than shift burden of proof-it remains to the
end of the case to be considered by the jury, if a fair question of fact is presented.
Compensation was affirmed.
Burning v. Sheffield Farms Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 241, 187 N.Y.S.2d 666 (3d
Dep't 1959). Decedent had suffered extreme pain from the work-connected crushing
and partial amputation of his finger. Morphine, codeine, demerol, and nembutal were
given in the hospital. After discharge, decedent was found in a comatose condition. A
nembutal capsule was found on bathroom floor although nembutal had not been pre-
scribed. Death from overdose of barbiturates was held accidental, not suicidal.
Epstein v. City of New York, 283 App. Div. 751, 128 N.Y.S.2d 67 (3d Dep't 1954),
in which there was evidence that the deceased city employee had, the day before his
death, confessed to taking bribes.
Cf. Beeler v. Hildan Crown Container Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 163, 271 N.Y.S.2d
373 (3d Dep't 1966). Decedent suffered fatal injuries when he fell from a 12th-story
window. The window sill was 36 inches high, and directly in front of it was a radiator
32 inches high which extended out 10/2 inches. Decedent had attempted suicide be-
fore, and was under the care of a psychiatrist, who had warned of possible suicidal
tendencies. This was held to be sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption against
suicide.
McLaughlin v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 282 App. Div. 782, 123 N.Y.S.2d 14(3d Dep't 1953), holding the presumption against suicide overcome by the following
facts: deceased was in ill health and had a heart ailment; the physical facts indi-
cated that an accidental fall out of the window on the 18th floor was impossible; and
the deceased had no duties requiring him to go to an outside window.
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before; and he might have stood on the middle of the guard rail,
from which point he could have fallen accidentally into the stack.
CONCLUSION
The basic suicide defense rule, like many other compensation
rules over the years, has experienced a complete reversal between
majority and minority rules. The majority rule now holds that sui-
cide is compensable if the injury produces mental derangement, and
the mental derangement produces suicide. The old Sponatski doc-
trine, that suicide is not compensable unless there has followed as the
direct result of a work-connected injury an insanity of such severity
as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable
impulse or in a delirium of frenzy, without conscious volition to pro-
duce death, has been relegated to distinctly minority status.
Moreover, in view of the strength of the trend and in view of the
fact that the old rule had its origin in demonstrably irrelevant tort
and criminal law concepts it may be confidently predicted that the
surviving remnants of Sponatski will disappear as opportunities are
presented to appellate courts to bring their doctrine into line with
the modern rule.

